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Who­has­a­right­to­live,­and­why?­Michael­Gorman,­in­his­essay­“Personhood,­Poten-
tiality, and Normativity” (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,  Summer 2011) 
argues not that it is mistaken to base the fetal right to life on potentiality but that an 
argument­on­this­basis­will­be­extraordinarily­difficult­to­make­because­“potentiality”­
has so many senses. The senses of “potentiality” include but are not limited to (1) the 
immediately exercisable capacity for “ready rationality,” (2) the ability to develop 
“ready rationality” under normal conditions (but this excludes humans with severe 
genetic defects and those suffering catastrophic brain damage), and (3) the ability 
to develop “ready rationality” under extraordinary conditions. (This last includes 
human beings with severe genetic defects and those suffering catastrophic brain 
damage, but would also include, as Gorman notes, kittens and tulips made rational 
by some sort of miracle.) Gorman’s list of various meanings of “potentiality” could 
also add (4) basic natural capacity (whether or not it is immediately exercisable), 
which is a position articulated by Robert P. George, Christopher Tollefsen, Patrick 
Lee, and many others.
Gorman­notes,­quite­properly,­that­defining­“potentiality”­or­“capacity”­and­then­
getting­clear­on­what­is­or­is­not­logically­possible­within­the­category­so­defined­is­a­
tricky matter. These complexities are explored also in J. A. Burgess’s “Potential and 
Foetal Value” (Journal of Applied Philosophy,­May­2010).­With­some­justification,­
Gorman fears that we might be clarifying the obscure (whether the human fetus has 
moral status) by means of the even more obscure (what is logically possible). 
So­as­an­alternative,­Gorman­proposes­that­we­link­personhood­and­­normativity:­
“There are ‘norm-constituted’ categories or kinds. For a kind of this sort, there is at 
least one feature such that an entity belongs to the kind only if it should have that 
feature­(not:­only­if­it­does have it).” “Should” is meant here in a non-moral sense, 
such that if a being is lacking in what it should have, it is imperfect, not yet brought 
to the point of its having all that it needs for its perfection. The standard of perfection 
is the normal adult. Normativity of this kind is embedded in “objective differences 
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between sickness and health, normalcy and defect, immaturity and maturity, and 
so­on.”­Gorman­then­defines­a­being­with­basic­moral­status­in­terms­of­this­nor-
mativity:­“A­person­is­an­individual­substance­that­is­subject­to­the­norm­of­ready­
rationality. Any individual substance that should be rational, in the sense of ‘should’ 
adumbrated above, is a person.”
A question that remains is, what reason do we have to think it true that every 
“individual substance that is subject to the norm of ready rationality” is a being that 
has­a­right­to­life?­To­answer­this­question,­it­might­help­to­turn­from­disputed­cases­
to­obvious­ones.­It­may­be­best­to­begin­with­what­is­not­in­dispute:­that­it­is­wrong­
to kill you or me. Why­is­it­wrong­to­kill­you­or­me?­I­believe­it­is­wrong­to­kill­us­
because­it­would­undermine­our­flourishing.­Since­this­wrongfulness­is­not­limited­
just to you and me but extends to all others who are like us, it is wrong to kill anyone 
who­has­flourishing­like­ours.­(Some­might­argue­all­mammals­have­flourishing­like­
ours, or all animals or all sentient beings. Whether or not dolphins or great apes have 
flourishing­like­ours,­other­human­beings­undoubtedly­do.)­
This argument is similar to Donald Marquis’s future-of-value argument.1 
However, his view excludes from protection human beings in the last stages of life as 
well as some seriously handicapped human beings who do not have a future of value 
(as­Marquis­understands­it).­The­flourishing-like-ours­argument­is­inclusive­enough­
to include all human beings. It also has the advantage that it explains what is wrong 
generally with a variety of acts. Mutilation, kidnapping, and rape, for example, do 
not­take­away­a­future­like­ours,­but­do­inhibit­flourishing­like­ours.­
In a wonderful essay, “Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong,” Donald Marquis 
compares two kinds of defense of human life, namely, the future-of-value view 
(which I will call by its initials, FOV) and the substantial identity or basic capacity 
view advocated by Frank Beckwith, Patrick Lee, and Robert P. George (which can be 
identifed by its authors’ initials, BLG).2 In his article, Marquis begins by addressing 
the strengths of the FOV account. In many ways, FOV and BLG are similar, so we 
will focus on some differences.
FOV and BLG part ways in their account of precisely the wrong done in killing. 
Marquis writes, “The future of value view locates the wrong of killing just where 
it should be in another respect. It locates the wrong of killing in the prospective 
future of the victim. When Fred kills Joe, Fred does not alter Joe’s past. Joe’s past 
is already completed. It cannot be changed. Furthermore, when Fred kills Joe, Fred 
does not really alter Joe’s present. The present is instantaneous; it divides the past 
and the present. Because killing should make a difference to the victim, it must 
concern­the­victim’s­prospective­future.”  3 Marquis is correct that killing does not 
1 Donald Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (April 
1989):­183–202.
2­Donald­Marquis,­“Why­Abortion­Is­Seriously­Wrong:­Two­Views,”­in­Bioethics with 
Liberty and Justice: Themes in the Work of Joseph M. Boyle, ed. Christopher Tollefsen (New 
York:­Springer,­2011),­3–22.
3 Ibid., 4.
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alter the past, but what it always does is change the present while it may or may not 
alter the future. When Fred kills Joe, Fred does really alter Joe’s present, causing 
a change in Joe from being living to being deceased. Furthermore, if someone is 
about to be killed or die of natural causes anyway, then they do not have a FOV, but 
in such a case it would still be wrong to kill them according to BLG. Killing does 
make a difference to the victim precisely by altering the victim in the only way that 
the victim can be altered. The past is gone, the future does not yet exist, so the way 
a victim is harmed is in the present. 
Marquis­notes­that­both­FOV­and­BLG­fit­“killing­into­the­category­of­harm.”­
But in explaining this point, it seems clear that BLG has an advantage over FOV. 
On the FOV view, abortion would be much worse than the killing of a forty-year-
old, since it deprives the deceased of a much greater future value. This seems both 
counterintuitive and contrary to the commonly held beliefs that everyone who has 
a right to live has an equal right to live by virtue presumably of losing something of 
equal value, namely, their life. Aside from circumstantial differences, all intentional 
killing of the innocent is equally wrong.4
Next, Marquis compares FOV to various accounts of killing which (unlike 
BLG) base the wrongfulness of killing on an individual’s positive attitude toward 
his­or­her­future:­“Versions­of­such­accounts­refer­to­one’s­hope­for­one’s­future,­or­
to one’s desire to live, or to one’s plans and projects concerning one’s future life, or 
to one’s caring about one’s future, or to one’s valuing one’s future, or to one’s  taking 
an­interest­in­one’s­future.” 5­Marquis­criticizes­these­views­because­“they­do­not­
account for the wrongness of killing human adults who lack a positive attitude toward 
their futures. For example, they do not account for the wrongness of killing those 
who suffer from severe depression, or those who ask you to kill them because they 
want­to­sacrifice­their­lives­to­the­gods­or­to­those­who­have­been­given­some­drug­
that­causes­them­to­want­to­die.” 6 To make Marquis’s survey more complete, it is 
important to note that David Boonin’s view does account for these sorts of cases by 
4­See­Christopher­Kaczor,­“Equal­Rights­and­Unequal­Wrongs:­Human­Dignity­and­
the Ethics of Abortion,” First Things, August –September 2011, 21–23.
5 Marquis “Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong,” 4, citing various criteria for the right 
to live, including having hope for one’s future, Mark Brown, “The Morality of Abortion and 
the Deprivation of Futures,” Journal of Medical Ethics­26­(2000):­103–107;­having­a­desire­
to live, Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2­(1972):­
37–65, and Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge,­UK:­Cambridge­University­Press,­
1979);­having­plans­and­projects,­David­DeGrazia,­Human Identity and Bioethics (New 
York:­Cambridge­University­Press,­2005);­caring­about­one’s­future,­Jeff­Reiman,­Abortion 
and the Way We Value Human Life­(Lanham,­MD:­Rowman­and­Littlefield,­1999);­valuing­
one’s future, John Harris, “The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life,” Journal of 
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics­9.4­(1999):­293–308;­and­taking­an­interest­in­one’s­future,­
Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom (New­York:­Knopf,­1993),­and­Bonnie­Steinbock,­Life Before Birth­(New­York:­
Oxford University Press, 1992).
6 Ibid.
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positing “ideal desires,” that is, the desire that the agent would have if not depressed, 
on drugs, or brainwashed by a religious cult. 7 
Patrick Lee has provided a superb explanation of why such understandings of 
the right to live fail. He writes,
The positive attitude account puts the cart before the horse. Conditions are 
not worthwhile because they are desired; rather, they are desirable because 
they are worthwhile, because they have whatever it takes to make something 
worth being desired. Clearly, some of our desires are bad and some are merely 
whimsical. Since worthless objects are sometimes desired, it follows that being 
desired cannot be what makes an object to be worthwhile. So, prior to being 
desired,­the­object­of­desire­must­have­something­in­it­which­makes­it­fitting­
or suitable to being desired. What makes a thing good does not consist in its 
being the satisfaction of desires or preferences; rather, desires and preferences 
are rational only if they are in line with what is genuinely good. So, a state of 
affairs should be desired or cared for if it is inherently valuable. A condition’s 
being valuable makes desires for it reasonable, not vice versa.8 
We can and ought to shape what we desire and value. This takes place in part by 
introspection to determine what we truly desire as opposed to what we desire in an 
unconsidered­or­superficial­way.­Even­more­importantly,­we­ought­to­shape­what­we­
desire­by­trying­to­determine­what­is­actually­fulfilling­for­us,­what­is­objectively­
good, rather than merely subjectively pleasing, perhaps because of vicious habit. As 
Aristotle­pointed­out,­the­desires­of­a­virtuous­man­and­a­vicious­man­are­not­alike:­
as a person becomes more virtuous by choosing good acts, his desires change over 
time so that he wants to do what is right.
Marquis turns next to the substantial identity account advocated by BLG. He 
sees some serious problems with this account. He writes, 
That we are human beings, and that fetuses are human beings, are biological 
facts.­As­a­general­rule,­biological­facts­aren’t­morally­significant.­That­we­
have one Y chromosome does not give us more rights than those [who lack 
a Y chromosome]. That we are Caucasian does not give us more rights than 
those who are not. Accordingly, why should the biological fact that we are 
human­have­any­great­moral­significance?­Singer­has­labeled­the­view­that­
the biological property of being a human being makes, without further argu-
ment, a moral difference “speciesism.” Singer’s point is that the connection 
between the biological and the moral of which substantial identity theorists 
are so fond is arbitrary.9 
Gorman’s perspective is relevant here. The biological species of an organism is 
relevant in terms of determining which normative framework(s) to make use of in 
7 I have written elsewhere that Boonin’s account also ends up failing. Christopher 
Kaczor,­The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice 
(New­York:­Routledge,­2011),­sec.­4.1.1.
8 Patrick Lee, “Substantial Identity, Rational Nature, and the Right to Life,” in Bioethics 
with Liberty and Justice, ed. Tollefsen, 25, original emphasis.
9 Marquis, “Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong,” 5, citing Singer, Practical Ethics, 117.
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considering­the­flourishing­of­the­being­in­question.­The­normative­connects­the­
biological and the moral in a non-arbitrary way.
Lee’s essay also makes reference to the idea of an orientation to rationality. 
This is possessed by all human beings in virtue of what they are, and it distinguishes 
human beings from (to use an example of Gorman’s) kittens that, if injected with a 
special drug, would have this orientation. Either one is or is not the kind of being 
whose­flourishing­consists­in­making­use­of­reason­and­will.­Of­course,­a­human­
being­may­have­or­fail­to­have­flourishing­like­ours­in­any­number­of­degrees,­but­
the­orientation­to­flourishing­like­ours­is­something­one­either­has­or­does­not­have.
If all human beings have a right to live, the question of when human beings 
begin to exist becomes relevant. In his article “Stem Cell Research and the  Problem 
of Embryonic Identity,” Phillip Montague argues that “the claim that all adult human 
beings­once­existed­as­zygotes­actually­stands­or­falls­with­the­possibility­of­tracking­
the­continuous­existence­of­single­individuals­from­zygotes­to­adult­humans,­or—in­
the­reverse­direction—from­adults­to­zygotes”­(Journal of Ethics, December 2011). 
This assertion is unfair, because the targets of his critique, Robert P. George and 
Christopher Tollefsen, repeatedly deny that all adult human beings once existed as 
zygotes.­In­their­book­Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, now in its second edi-
tion, they state, “For the vast majority of us—all those who were not the products 
of­monozygotic­twinning­(i.e.,­twinning­from­a­single­fertilized­egg)—we­began­
to­exist­at­conception:­the­point­at­which­a­new­and­distinct­individual­of­Homo 
 sapiens­came­into­being­as­a­complete,­living­human­organism.” 10 In this passage, 
and others, they deny that all­adult­human­beings­once­existed­as­zygotes.­Montague­
also critiques a straw man when he writes, “A single individual cannot become 
two individuals. Of course, individuals can generate other individuals while they 
themselves remain single individuals.” Montague offers no evidence whatsoever 
that George and Tollefsen hold that a single individual becomes two individuals in 
the case of twins or any other case. 
Conflicting­interpretations­of­the­twinning­phenomena­have­been­offered.­For­
example, one could view twinning as the ceasing to exist of the original embryo 
(Zyggy) giving rise to two other embryos (Sally and Allie). One could also view 
the original embryo, Zyggy, as surviving the twinning process and giving rise via 
budding to another embryo (Allie). 
Montague then applies these two views to the non-twinned embryo. The divi-
sion­of­one­cell­into­two­is­typically­thought­to­involve­the­destruction­of­the­first­
cell, which gives rise to the daughter cells. But if this is true, argues Montague, the 
zygote­was­destroyed­in­the­first­cleavage­and­neither daughter cell is identical to the 
zygote.­On­the­other­hand,­if­we­think­that­the­first­cell­is­not­destroyed,­but­rather­
through budding gives rise to other cells, then the original cell always exists in the 
multicellular embryo, “which implies that no adult human being can possibly be 
identical­to­Z,­and­no­adult­human­being­has­ever­existed­as­a­zygote.”
10 Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, 2nd 
ed.­(Princeton:­Witherspoon­Institute,­2011),­69–70.
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A phase sortal can be thought of, in Aristotelian terms, as an accidental charac-
teristic, that is, a characteristic that a subject may or may not have and yet remain the 
same­individual.­Thus,­a­zygote­is­a­phase­sortal­in­the­life­span­of­a­human­being,­
for­at­the­first­cell­division­the­zygote­no­longer­exists.­In­a­similar­way,­a­teenager­is­
a phase sortal in the life of a human being, for at her twentieth birthday, the teenager 
ceases­to­exist.­The­question­is­not­whether­a­teenager­or­a­zygote­ceases­to­exist,­
however, but rather whether the living organism ceases to exist. In the cases of both 
the­zygote­and­the­teenager,­the­living­organism­survives­the­accidental­change.­
In­an­earlier­article,­Marquis­offered­another­argument­why­the­zygote­is­not­
a­human­being:­“This­one-celled­human­being,­this­zygote,­will­split­into­two­cells.­
Each of the two cells does not seem to be different in any important respect from 
the­human­from­which­each­originated.­The­situation­here­is­like­the­fission­of­one­
amoeba into two amoebas, with (let us suppose) no space separating the amoebas. 
Therefore­if­the­zygote­from­which­the­two­human­cells­originate­is­a­human­being,­
then­each­of­these­two­cells­must­also­be­a­human­being.” 11 
In “Some Questions for Philosophical Embryology” (American Catholic Philo-
sophical Quarterly, Summer 2011), Christopher Tollefsen responds to  Marquis’s 
point. Tollefsen notes that at three to four days there is already differentiation among 
the cells of the embryo, some cells going on to become the inner cell mass and oth-
ers going on to become the outer cell mass. He also notes an experiment in which 
Magdalena­Zernicka-Goetz­of­Cambridge­University­dyed­ the­first­ two­cells­ of­
the embryo, one red and one blue, and then tracked their descendants. The results, 
published in Nature,­showed­that­“the­first­division­of­the­[fertilized]­egg­influences­
the fate of each cell and ultimately, all the tissues of the body. . . . What is clear is 
that developmental biologists will no longer dismiss early mammalian embryos as 
featureless bundles of cells.”12 If the early cells were in fact exactly the same, then the 
function and developmental paths of these cells should be the same. Much continues 
to be written on the moral status of the human embryo, but the best biological and 
ethical­research­points­to­the­truth­that­all­human­beings—even­in­the­first­stages­
of life—merit equal basic protection from intentional harm.
chrisTopher kAczor  
11 Donald Marquis, “The Moral-Principle Objection to Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research,” Metaphilosophy­38­(2007):­198–199,­quoted­by­Tollefsen­in­“Some­Questions­
for Philosophical Embryology”; see next paragraph.
12 Helen Pearson, “Your Destiny, From Day One,” news feature, Nature 418 (July 4, 
2002):­14­and­15,­quoted­by­Tollefsen.
